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This thesis discusses the evolution of the Japanese Monetary Policy and its
relationship to the Yen carry trade. I track this development from inception. I
specifically examine how the central Bank of Japan (BOJ) is proceeding now to withdraw
Japan from the zero interest rate policy. Specifically covered are the last two years in
which central bank policy changed from quantitative easing to interest rate targeting. I
present evidence to show how Japan’s zero interest rate policy and the evolution of Yen
carry trade activity coincided with a reduction in risk premiums throughout the world. I
also show how the withdrawal of the Yen carry trade had a temporary impact on those
risk premiums in May and June of 2006 and January and February of 2007. Estimates of
the size of financial markets impacts are included.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s while most of the world’s economies were growing, Japan
experienced a prolonged and consistent period of deflation. Economic policies by the
government of Japan and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) included a continued reduction of
interest rates.1
The rest of the world experienced inflation albeit at a low level.2 Japan was the
only G-7 (Group of Seven) 3 country to have persistent deflation. During the decade of
the 1990s it averaged about 1 percent per year.4 The inflation average of the G-7
countries was a positive 1 ½ percent per year. The six (ex-Japan) other G-7 countries
were all positive. The average of the seven countries was brought down to 1 ½ percent
per year by the negative rate of inflation (deflation) in Japan.
As the decade of the 1990s gave way to the first decade of the new millennium,
Japan’s trend of deflation worsened. Computations for the period of 2000 to 2006 show
that the average deflation rate in Japan started to exceed 1 percent per year. This
occurred while the median of standard deviation of trends, otherwise known as the
measure of the variances of those trends, remained constant among the G-7 countries.
Statistical evidence computed for the Monetary Policy Forum in 2007 demonstrates how

1

Data is from the Bank of Japan (English translation website); minutes of various meetings from 19962007.
2
Stephen G. Cecchetti, Peter Hooper, Bruce C. Kasman, Kermit L. Schoenholtz and Mark W. Watson,
U.S. Monetary Policy Forum 2007, Understanding the Evolving Inflation Process, February 2007, page 14.
3
The Group of Seven countries (G-7) are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and
the United States.
4
Cecchetti, et al., loc. cit.
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Japan’s deflation rate was worsening while the average variance among the G-7 countries
was constant. Clearly, Japan faced an extraordinary situation.
On March 19, 2001, the Bank of Japan announced “new procedures for money
market operations and monetary easing.”5 The Bank of Japan had already reduced its
interest rate to zero using classic interest rate targeting. Now they were attempting to add
“quantitative easing”6 as an additional technique in order to force liquidity into the
marketplace and attempt to arrest the accelerating deflationary trend. The BOJ initiated
its first quantitative easing procedure following the announcement of its March 19, 2001
change and subsequently issued a procedural manual indicating how it would attempt to
add additional reserves in its operations.
The BOJ continued its policy indicating that this was an alteration of the zero
interest rate policy that had previously existed in Japan. Essentially, Japan engaged in
rapid expansion of money using the electronic equivalent of the printing press. Initial
tranches raised the current balances to five trillion Yen. The BOJ announced that they
would accelerate the growth rate of their monetary base.
During that period from March 19, 2001 through March 9, 2006, the BOJ
maintained its policy of quantitative easing. Trillions of Yen were monetized, created
and injected into world reserves. The policy setting interest rate of the BOJ was
maintained at zero. Statements from the BOJ continued to reaffirm quantitative easing as
a strategy in concert with a zero interest rate policy.7

5

Data is from Bank of Japan (English translation website); minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee,
March 19, 2001, page 1.
6
Mark M. Spiegel, FRBSF (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) Economic Letter Number 2006-28,
October 20, 2006, page 1.
7
See Bank of Japan website (www.boj.or.jp/en).

3
This initial BOJ target was raised nine additional times between March 2001 and
December 2004 and eventually reached 35 trillion Yen.8 The BOJ implemented that
policy by buying Japanese government securities principally the 10-year government
bond in order to inject those reserves. The effect was to reduce interest rates in the bond
market Japan. At one point this benchmark interest rate reached a low of approximately
½ of 1 percent per year.9
The persistent use of quantitative easing by the BOJ and the continual statements
coming from the BOJ led global financial markets to believe that a zero interest rate
policy would be maintained for a prolonged period of time. Market expectations were
altered by this policy initiative. Clearly market expectations about interest rates and
inflation rates are critical to financial market activities.10 Economic literature is replete
with discussions of market expectations and how they are the drivers of policy.
Debate continues on whether the policy of quantitative easing worked to turn the
Japanese economy from its deflationary trend because of this quantitative easing policy.
There are some indications that the banking system of Japan profited because of this form
of monetary subsidy. This enabled the Japanese banking system to survive without
forced liquidations and bankruptcies.11
Another way to measure success of this policy is to compare growth rates among
the G-7 countries. Cecchetti, et al., found that the “median standard deviation of the
growth across decades”12 declined in six of the G-7 countries during the last two decades

8

Spiegel, loc. cit.
Source is Bloomberg data base.
10
See The Federal Reserve Board, Remarks by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Krosner, March 12,
2007.
11
Spiegel, loc. cit.
12
Cecchetti, et al., op. cit., p. 21.
9
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of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. “The notable exception” was
Japan where the decline was quite small.13 Whether or not the modest decline in Japan
and the Japanese exception to the other G-7 countries was due to quantitative easing or
other factors is a subject of debate among economists. The coincidence of events
suggests that quantitative easing by the BOJ had some influence on the Japanese banking
system and on Japanese policy.

13

Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF THE YEN CARRY TRADE

In its simplest form, the Yen carry trade describes an investment strategy. “An
investor borrows a given amount in a low-interest-rate currency” (the funding currency)
and converts the money funds into a high interest rate currency (the target currency) and
lends the resulting amount in the target currency at a higher interest rate.14 In theory,
such transactions should not be profitable because the investor takes on currency risk; the
currency markets know it and adjust accordingly. Under normal circumstances there is a
classic economic expectation that the differential in interest rates between the two
currencies is offset by the futures pricing of those currencies in the derivative or forward
markets. San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank economist, Michelle Cavallo describes
this version as the way in which markets “exploit the forward premium of one currency
relative to another.”15
The strategy involved in forward premiums is to sell the currencies for which the
forward exchange rate is higher than the spot market exchange rate and buy the currency
for which the forward exchange rate is lower than the spot exchange rate. This use of the
derivatives market is an alternate form to direct borrowing. Currencies that are at a
forward premium are like the funding currencies in the first example and those that are at
a forward discount are like the target currencies.16

14

Michele Cavallo, FRBSF (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) Eonomic Letter Number 2006-31,
November 17, 2006, page 1.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
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A computational example may be helpful. Suppose the Yen is trading at the
exchange rate of 121 to the U.S. dollar and the lending rate in borrowing 10 million Yen
is 0.5 percent. An individual may borrow 10 million Yen from a Japanese lending
institution, convert it to dollars and buy $826,446 worth of U.S. treasury obligations at an
interest rate of 5 percent. Note that the interest rate on the U.S. treasury is ten times that
of the interest rate on the Japanese loan. In the future, the investor will have to repay the
10 million Yen with interest. Let’s assume for this example that the period of time
involved is one year. Therefore, the repayment will be 10.5 million Yen since we will
assume simple interest of ½ of 1 percent.
In order to obtain the dollars and convert them back to Yen the investor will sell
the treasury obligation and receive a 5 percent interest rate for the same period of time.
Therefore, the proceeds of the sale of the treasury obligation will be $867,769. If the
Yen/dollar exchange rate is 115.81 the investor will have a break even trade. Thus, the
investor has taken exchange rate risk on the Yen/dollar currency exchange rate and can
calculate it in advance. The investor determines what exchange rate it takes to break
even and, therefore, makes a judgment as to whether or not this trade will be profitable.
During the period of quantitative easing, the BOJ continually advised the market
that they were going to maintain this policy of very low interest rate. Since their policy
interest rate was maintained at zero, Japanese lending institutions could profitably loan
money at ½ of 1 percent. They would generate a profit of 50 basis points (a basis point
equals 1/100th of 1 percent). Global borrowers could borrow large sums at ½ of 1 percent
and buy other securities or make other investments denominated in other currencies than
the Japanese Yen.

7
CHAPTER 3
YEN CARRY TRADE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECLINE IN GLOBAL RISK
PREMIUMS

Risk premiums narrowed throughout the world during the period in which
deflation reigned in Japan and the BOJ reduced its interest rates to zero and then
commenced the zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing. Various measures of
risk premia declined throughout this period, in part, due to the excess liquidity and
funding of the Yen carry trade. More and more investors around the world found that
they could borrow or use derivatives and forward premium contracts near zero interest
rates and invest in other assets globally. Considerable evidence exists that higher
yielding currencies like the Australian and New Zealand currencies had huge increases in
foreign exchange transactions. Much of that activity is attributable to the Yen carry
trade.17
Risk premiums can be measured. The 11 charts in the Appendix show the
changes in risk premia (1) using interest rates within the United States, (2) different credit
categories of bonds, (3) interest rates outside the United States, and (4) measures of credit
insurance (credit default swaps).
The evidence seems clear. Global risk premiums continued to narrow throughout
the period of March 19, 2001 through March 9, 2006.

17

Ibid.
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CHAPTER 4
CHANGE IN BANK POLICY AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAW OF
THE CARRY TRADE

On March 9, 2006 the BOJ announced a “change in the guideline for money
market operations.”18 The monetary policy committee of the BOJ altered its view and
determined that it would begin to withdraw quantitative easing. That would eliminate the
excess balances of Yen that had been created and injected into the system for the
previous five years. The BOJ cited their view that “Japan’s economy continues to
recover steadily.”19 They outlined why they determined that they were going to revert to
an interest rate setting policy. They maintained the interest rate at their March meeting at
zero.20 The BOJ commenced withdrawal of excess Yen balances on May 9, 2006 (see
charts in Appendix). Those transactions were the first that were visible in financial
markets. The result and shock is shown in the charts (see Appendix) in which risk
premiums widened abruptly and substantially in response.
Japan was removing, for the first time, the raw material of the zero interest rate
policy. Hence, it was making the Yen carry trade less profitable. At the margin, some
places in the world were liquidating their Yen carry trade positions. Market transactions
for the five weeks from mid-May through mid-June while the Japanese Central Bank
engaged in this policy were volatile and substantial.21

18

See the Bank of Japan, Change in the Guideline for Money Market Operations, minutes of the
meeting, March 9, 2006, page 1.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
William Pesek Jr., Bloomberg.com, Japan’s Boom May Explode Yen – Carry Trade: William Pesek
Jr., February 22, 2006.
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Stock markets throughout the world lost approximately five trillion dollars in
aggregate market value in five weeks.22 Interest rates rose in all bond markets throughout
the world.23
We estimate that the change in interest rates caused a decline in value of
approximately two trillion U.S. dollars in bond markets. Thus, a total estimate of the first
withdrawal of financial transactions in elimination of the Yen carry trade can be
estimated. It reduced market values of global stocks and bonds by approximately seven
trillion in U.S. dollar terms.
The estimates of the Yen withdrawal vary but center around 70 billion U.S. dollar
equivalents.24 No one knows for sure but an estimate of 70 billion with a market impact
of seven trillion approximates a ratio of about 100:1. 100:1 is an expected ratio of the
high powered reserve multiplier into financial assets when there are no required currency
reserves. For purposes of this discussion we will accept Hale’s estimate of 70 billion and
the ratio 100:1. It is important to note that the 1 percent or the 100:1 ratio fits a
characteristic in which you would include the cost of transactions or other financial
frictions. That is why non-fractional reserve additions to the world’s financial system do
not result in the multiplier number infinity. In theory, without transaction costs or
friction, the multiplier of reserves is mathematically infinite.
The BOJ announced their formal change in monetary operations on July 14, 2006.
They had implemented the withdrawal of reserves from mid-May to mid-June. They then
raised their interest rate from zero to 0.25 percent. That ended the zero interest rate

22

Source is World Federation of Stock Exchanges.
Source is Bloomberg data base.
24
David Hale, August 2006 NBEIC (National Business Economics Issue Council) Quarterly Conference
in Green Bay, Wisconsin.
23
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policy that had commenced years before. It also ended quantitative easing which had
commenced in March 19, 2001.
The BOJ offered their forecast that the Japanese “economy is likely to expand for
a sustained period.”25 In further explanation of their policy change the BOJ said that,
the Bank has maintained zero interest rates for an extended period, and the
stimulus from monetary policy has been gradually amplified against the backdrop
of steady improvements in economic activity and prices.26
They issued an additional forward looking statement indicating that “today’s policy
decision will contribute to ensuring price stability and achieving sustainable growth in the
medium to long term.”27
Japan’s second interest rate increase occurred in February 2007. During the
period from July 14th, 2006 through January 2007, the Bank of Japan continued to
maintain an interest rate of 0.25 percent. In its commentary from various meetings and
minutes, BOJ officials discussed the very slow policy change pace with which they must
normalize the interest rate.
In January 2007, the meeting of the BOJ indicated an interest in raising the
interest rate again. At the February meeting in 2007, the BOJ raised the interest rate to
0.5 percent from 0.25 percent. Financial market reaction, again, was volatile. The
world’s stock markets lost approximately three trillion dollars in market value in the
space of about three weeks.28
The bond reaction was different. In the bond market, interest rates actually fell.
In the prior round, in 2006, interest rates rose when Japan made its first move away from

25
26
27
28

Bank of Japan, Change in Guideline for Money Market Operations, July 14, 2006, page 1.
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid.
Source is World Federation Stock Exchange Data.
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the zero interest rate policy. An estimate of the increase in market value in bonds (bond
prices and values rise when interest rates fall and fall when interest rates rise) using the
Bank for International Settlements’ aggregate bond data suggests that the world’s bond
markets increased in market value by approximately one trillion U.S. dollars. Thus, the
combined effect of Japan’s second interest rate increase was a three trillion dollar
deterioration in stock market value and a one trillion dollar improvement in bond market
value. This yields a net negative result of approximately two trillion. Various estimates
like Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley data base, David Hale and others suggest that the
withdrawal of liquidity by the BOJ was approximately 20 billion suggesting that the ratio
of 100:1 was maintained.
The quantitative easing measurement was fully reported after March 31, 2007
when the Japanese 2006 fiscal year ended, Market News International said:
JAPAN: The BOJ’s assets decreased sharply to hit the lowest level in seven years
at the end of March as the central bank started to depart from a superloose
monetary policy, a BOJ report showed Friday, Jiji reports. As of Mar 31 the final
day of fiscal 2006, the balance of the bank’s assets, including government
securities, totaled 112.12 trillion yen, down 32.7 trillion yen, or 22.6 pct, from a
year before. The value of annual decline was the largest ever, while the balance
was the lowest since 106 trillion yen at the end of fiscal 1999. The decrease in the
overall asset balance came as the BOJ siphoned excess liquidity from financial
institutions following its departure from the five-year-old quantitative easing
policy in March 2006 and from the zero interest rate policy three months later.29
The charts (see Appendix) show Japan’s interest rate hike 1 and 2 and the result in
movement in risk premium measures. Clearly risk premium measures did not deteriorate
as rapidly and as extensively in the second Japan interest rate hike period as they did in
the first. All measures of risk premiums support this conclusion as the charts (see
Appendix) show.
29

Market News International, April 6, 2007.
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Markets are becoming accustomed to the change in Japanese interest rates as the
BOJ returns its policy making to normal. Global investors who are involved in Yen carry
trade positions are now able to more easily forecast the results as Japan normalizes
policy. Expectations are that the normalization of interest rate policy in Japan will
proceed slowly and continue through 2008.30
Many observers expect the withdrawal of carry trade to proceed at a slow pace.31
The BOJ is not about to derail its economic recovery. The policy making in the BOJ
includes the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic Planning unlike our
Federal Reserve System where our U.S. Central Bank acts totally independently. In
Japan, two officials from the government sit in the Central Bank meetings. In fact,
Article 19 of the BOJ Act allows the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic
Planning to request a postponement of an interest rate decision until the next meeting.
This happened at the January 2007 meeting which is why the interest rate change did not
occur until February.
Analysts expect the Yen carry trade to continue at an albeit gradually reducing
price. There is no reason to expect it to end abruptly. The gap between Japanese interest
rates and the rest of the interest rates in the world still support the profitable notion that
borrowing in a currency where the policy interest rate is 0.5 percent and lending in
economies where interest rates are higher (5 ¼ percent in the U.S., 5 ¼ percent in the
United Kingdom and 3 ¾ percent at the European Central Bank) still maintains a
profitable spread. It is important to note that the currency risk in borrowing Japanese

30
31

Pesek, Jr., loc. cit.
Credit Suisse, Global Equity Strategy, February 27, 2007, page 6.
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Yen has now risen.32 For the first time risk premiums are widening in the forward
markets in Yen. Investors realize that the BOJ will no longer create huge amounts of
excess liquidity in order to maintain a zero interest rate. They are now back to
normalizing policy making by targeting interest rates instead of monetary aggregates and
quantitative easing.33
The Bank of International Settlements estimates that “cross-border Yen
borrowing” increased by $161 billion in the two years ending in 2005. Furthermore, they
estimate that “$120 billion”34 of that was channeled through tax haven countries and
international financial centers like the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands is a place
where offshore and unregulated hedge-funds are known to operate in volume.

32
33
34

Pesek, Jr., loc. cit.
The Wall Street Journal Online, Understanding the Carry Trade, March 5, 2007, page 1.
Ibid.
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CONCLUSION

The Yen carry trade evolved out of an attempt by the BOJ to alter monetary
policy from focusing on interest rates to implementing quantitative easing. In doing so,
the BOJ took the interest rate to zero percent as a policy rate and then injected additional
reserves for a continuing and persistent period of time.
The result of those excess reserves was to stimulate borrowing in Yen near a zero
percent interest rate and to encourage investing or lending in other currencies and other
securities at a higher expected return. For a period of time, global investors were able to
do this with near impunity. They continued to see the BOJ persist in the policy of zero
interest rates and continued to watch the BOJ officials state that they would not alter this
policy for some time.
In 2006, the BOJ altered the policy and gradually started the return to targeting
interest rates. They ceased engaging in quantitative easing. The first transaction in May
or June 2006 jolted the markets with a high level of volatility and a spike in risk
premiums. The results showed global financial markets losing seven trillion U.S. dollar
equivalent value in five weeks.
The second Japanese move in interest rates, which raised interest rates from 0.25
to 0.5 percent, had a substantially less impact on world financial markets although the
impact was a negative. Global financial markets experienced a value loss of
approximately two trillion U.S. dollar equivalents as the process of unwinding Yen carry
trade adjusted.

15
Yen carry trade has been discussed many times in the financial press and in the
world. According to Bianco Research, the words “carry trade” spiked to eleven hundred
stories a week from practically 20 or 30 stories a week as late as December of last year.35
Carry trade now seems to be old news. Markets are aware of its existence and its
influence on pricing and on risk premiums and are adjusting accordingly. The BOJ has
made known its intention to gradually alter its policy and longer term market projections
expect the BOJ to return to normalcy over the next 18 to 24 months.
As markets adjust with a return to normalcy, risk taking also returns. The
Gartman Letter in its recent analysis of market conditions offered the following: “the
market, for whatever reason seems suddenly willing to take on risk, that only a week ago
it was tossing over-board randomly.”36
Along with projections of a gradual Japanese recovery, albeit at a slow pace, it is
expected that exchange rates of Japanese Yen for the U.S. dollar will continue to decline
into 2009.37 Such strengthening of the Japanese Yen against the dollar introduces
additional risk to carry trade positions. Remember that a carry trade position is borrowed
Yen that is invested in other currencies (like the U.S. dollar). Even though the return in
the investment may be higher than the cost of the borrowing, the amounts of currency
needed to exchange in order to repay the Yen loan are greater. The adjustment process is
no longer done with impunity. It seems that the global subsidy from Japan’s zero interest
policy is gradually ending.

35

Bianco Research, L.L.C., Now What? March 15, 2007 conference call, page 5.
The Gartman Letter L.C., The Yen Is Weak; So Too The Swiss Franc, March 20, 2007, page 1.
37
Nariman Behravesh, Global Insight, The Global Economy Seems to Have Shrugged Off the U.S.
Slowdown: Is This the Beginning of a Multi-Locomotive World?, March 22, 2007, pages 14, 37 and 38.
36
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index of the normalized implied volatility on 1-month Treasury options
Appendix 10: (Chart 10) Merrill Option Volatility Index (MOVE) – Yield-curve
weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on 1-month Treasury options (2006 –
Present)
Appendix 11: (Chart 11) Global Bond Risk Premiums are Shrinking, In the United States
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